22 December 2020
How to Quantify a Proportionate Financial Punishment in the New EU Rule of Law Mechanism?
The principle of a proportionate financial measure enshrined in the new EU rule of law mechanism should be informed by an improved EU Justice Scoreboard (EUJS) drawing on rule of law indices. Thereby, the sensitive matter of determining the amount could be supported also by quantitative data. This is important, because the Commission will face high political pressure when acting under the new rule of law mechanism. Continue reading >>
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22 December 2020
Ein Freund, ein guter Freund
Der Kompromiss mit den Regierungen Ungarns und Polens bezüglich des Rechtstaatsmechanismus hat eine Menge – berechtigter - Kritik erfahren. Das Appeasement von Regierungen, die gegen die Grundwerte der EU verstoßen, ist zwar in der Logik der Institutionen und des politischen Handelns in der EU tief verwurzelt. Aber die zahme deutsche Reaktion auf die Eskapaden der ungarischen Regierung hat durchaus strukturelle Gründe, die weit über die Logik der EU-Entscheidungsprozesse hinausgehen. Der perpetuierte Empörungsloop über das ungarische Regime in deutschen Feuilletons und Polit-Talkshows, an dem regelmäßig auch Regierungspolitiker teilnehmen, verbirgt die Realität: Nämlich, dass die deutsche Regierung, und vor allem die deutsche Wirtschaft, sich längst mit dem ungarischen Regime zum gegenseitigen Interesse und Nutzen arrangiert hat. Continue reading >>
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14 December 2020
Towards an EU Cast in the Hungarian and Polish Mould
It is a serious achievement on Hungary’s and Poland’s part to drive EU institutions so far into mocking the rule of law in the spirit of defending it. Then again, this is exactly what illiberal constitutional engineering is about: using familiar constitutional and legal techniques for ends that subvert constitutionalism and the rule of law. Continue reading >>
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13 December 2020
Compromising the Rule of Law while Compromising on the Rule of Law
Some EU leaders may assert that EU money will now be brought under the rule of law given that the Conditionality Regulation is now guaranteed to pass. But they are wrong. Continue reading >>08 December 2020
Disqualifying Instability
The so-called conditionality mechanism (in other words: "money for the rule of law") provides that breaches of the principle of the rule of law that threaten the EU’s financial interests may lead to suspension of funding. Poland and Hungary oppose this conditionality as they – with good reason – fear that they might be affected by it. What is required not to be subject to this mechanism, however, is quite straightforward and can be reasonably expected by an EU Member State. Continue reading >>
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27 November 2020
Liebesgrüße aus Warschau
Warum die polnische Regierung deutsche Jurist_innen umwirbt Continue reading >>
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27 November 2020
From Warsaw with Love
Why the Polish government is wooing German jurists Continue reading >>
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23 May 2020
Showdown at the Last Chance Saloon
As a political slogan, and a guideline in times of crisis, ‘whatever it takes’ undoubtedly has enormous appeal, and may in certain circumstances justify novel and untried forms of action. However, in a polity governed by the rule of law, there are limits to this approach which, if not respected, may cause greater problems than those which provoked the action in the first place. Continue reading >>12 May 2020
Constitutional Constraints meet Political Pressure
The Finnish Constitutional Law Committee had already in April adopted a critical position towards the COVID 19 crisis measures in the EU. Last week the Committee continued its critical examination. It came to the conclusion that the Eurogroup decision to essentially remove all conditionality from the new loan facility of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is incompatible with the Finnish Constitution and expressed serious doubts about its compatibility with EU law. The Committee also repeated its concerns about the accumulation of financial risks deriving from EU membership. Continue reading >>
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04 April 2020
The European Stability Mechanism is a False Solution to a Real European Problem
The conflict opposing the Northern (and Eastern) to the Southern Member States has reemerged with special animosity in the last weeks. European governments have developed deep disagreements over how to distribute the costs not only of fighting the coronavirus epidemics, but also of the socio-economic reconstruction that would be required once the public health emergence has been overcome, and which will require mobilising resources on a scale unknown since the Second World War. Continue reading >>
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